There’s one bit of unfinished business I’d like to wrap up, though. I had written a bit about Haiti’s current situation in previous entries, and much of what I wrote seems to take a particular anti-US policy tone. My personal feelings aside, I didn’t really intend to present my views as one-sided or unsupported. As I mentioned in yesterday’s entry, I asked the Haiti List for help in finding some objective resources, but the people who responded only confessed to being equally in the dark.

I had never considered before that I take a certain type of news coverage for granted. I think much of the news media in the US is… well, at best, useless for keeping me accurately informed of what’s going on in the world. But if there’s one thing I can count on, it’s that it there are at least a few places I can consistently find accurate reporting presented by responsible journalists. In my brief time of studying Haitian politics, I’m not sure the same can be said for that country.

(I am aware that there are brave and dedicated Haitian journalists risking their lives to get the truth out. My point is that their job is a lot harder and more dangerous and the general Haitian public and world audience are far less likely to hear their voices.)

So, look, I’m not a journalist. I don’t know Thing One about reporting. I’m an amateur writer who is depending entirely on secondary or tertiary or quaternary sources for information, and then I’m trying to synthesize it and spit it back out so it makes sense to me. It’s just that, in the interest of fairness, I felt I had to at least try to present the other side of the Haiti question.

In particular, I wanted to find out what the US and International community’s policy towards Haiti is, and what is the basis for that policy? And, since the elections of 2000 are often mentioned in relation to US policy, what specifically were the flaws in the 2000 election?

If I were a real reporter, I probably would have called or emailed the sources here directly, but in the end, part laziness and part desire to regain my focus on Toussaint drove my decision not to. Instead, I’ll present here a survey and summary of what I was able to find online.

Please keep in mind, that while I have devoted significant time to finding relevant information, I’m not in a position to analyze the motivations of various sources or the veracity of their claims. What I offer here are my summaries of what I read, along with links to the relevant documents so that others who wish to make up their own minds will have a place to start. I can’t promise 100% accuracy, though I promise I’ve done my best. Sources appear in no particular order.

Elections in Haiti in 2000, Part I

Summary of information found online relating to Haiti’s Year 2000 elections and the international community’s policy towards Haiti.

Some facts about the election that do not seem to be disputed:

• The elections of May 21, 2000 were originally scheduled for November 1999. The delays were “due to logistical, technical, financial and political problems.” (ICIO)
• The elections in May, 2000 were generally peaceful.
• Most estimates note that 60% of the population voted in the May elections

• The elections in May 2000 were disputed mostly on the basis of the methods used to count the winners.

  Source: The United States Embassy in Haiti

  The United States has taken the position at least as early as February 2001 that the Haitian elections of 2000 were ‘flawed.’ Quoting from Washington File article by Eric Green dated February 7, 2001, the US Department of State ‘said Haiti has ‘considerable ground to cover in developing an effective and inclusive electoral process.’’ Apparently, the Organization of American States and independent political observers cast doubt on the validity of ‘some seats won by Aristide-supported candidates.’ The United Nations was forced to call off its mission in that country the day before Aristide’s inauguration because of increasing security concerns.

  Because of the results of the election and Haiti’s continuing problems in the areas of security and human rights, the US has suspended direct aid to the government of Haiti, and has encouraged the international community to do the same. In a May 2002 speech, Lino Gutierrez, principal deputy assistant secretary of state put the US policy this way.

  “Corruption, drug trafficking, human rights abuses, increasing authoritarianism, and a declining economy threaten Haiti’s fragile institutions,” he said. In response, the United States has adopted a policy toward Haiti that “rests on four pillars, all equally important,” Gutierrez said. “We seek to support efforts to strengthen democracy and improve respect for human rights; provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable Haitians, and actively promote sustainable economic development; discourage illegal migration, which threatens maritime safety and the lives of those who risk dangerous sea travel; and stem the flow of illegal drugs through Haiti” to the United States.

  To read continue reading Part I, click the link…
  
  Gutierrez cites the failure of Aristide and opposition parties to reach an accord as Haiti’s greatest obstacle to renewed US-Haiti relations. He continues:

  “It’s quite simple—the government of Haiti has only itself to blame for its deteriorating economy. The international community wants nothing more than to give Haiti a hand, but access to external assistance and loans will remain limited because the government of Haiti refuses to adhere to the most basic principles of good governance.” Even so, “our assistance to Haiti is substantial,” he pointed out. “On a per-capita basis, Haiti is one of the largest beneficiaries of U.S. aid in the world. Overall, U.S. humanitarian assistance [to Haiti] for the past four years totaled almost $300 million.”

  US aid dollars are channelled through NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) in order that the money will get to the people who need it most. In a fact sheet titled State Department Outlines U.S. Assistance to Haiti, the US Department of State points out that it has given Haiti more than $850 million in aid between 1995 and 2003. The money has gone to provide food assistance, health care, education, small business loans and to support programs which strengthen democracy. The US also “supports normal relations between Haiti and the international financial institutions,” which provide loans for infrastructure and economic development. As pointed out in this press release, U.S. Government Increases Humanitarian Assistance to Haiti, support for Fiscal Year 2003 was actually increased to almost $70 million.

  USAID continues to be the largest single donor to Haiti. The organization’s efforts to develop micro-finance in Haiti have been recognized by CGAP, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor.

  Despite the recognizing the need to continue aid to the world’s poorest country, the US remains firm in its political stance towards Haiti. In a press release entitled U.S. Urges Haitian Government to Create Conditions for Free Elections, Carol Fuller, U.S. alternate representative to the OAS says the US “will not support elections in Haiti ‘unless they are free, fair, and reflect the will of the [Haitian] people.’” In order to ensure this, Fuller says Haiti’s president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide must follow the recommendations of OAS Resolution 822 to hold free and fair elections.

  ---

  
  UPDATE 2/4/04 12:31 PM PST
  Thanks to the resources of the Haiti List at Bob Corbett’s Haiti Page I was able to uncover the following transcript from the State Department Daily Press Briefing for December 17, 2001. Earlier that day, armed attackers had stormed the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince. (See Part IV for a link to the OAS’s investigation of the incident.) Here’s what State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher had to say:

  QUESTION: Richard, can you talk about Haiti and what your understanding of the situation is there?
  MR. BOUCHER: Well, it’s probably similar to your understanding of the situation there, because basically we have seen a lot of different reports, and we don’t have much confirmation.
  What we know is an unknown number of armed assailants attacked the presidential palace in Port-au-Prince early this morning. There are also unconfirmed reports of several casualties, as well as attacks on other government facilities. It appears that government security units have repelled the attacks, and that the police are actively searching for the assailants.
  That is not a lot of definitive information. What I will say is the situation in Port-au-Prince is tense. There are reports of roadblocks, tire burnings, shootings, mobs attacking political opposition members and offices. We would ask all Haitians to remain calm, urge the Government of Haiti to take appropriate measures to restore and maintain calm. The US Embassy in Port-au-Prince is closed. They have closed all the offices today following reports about this morning’s attack, and they have urged US citizens in Haiti to stay at home today and to monitor radio reports concerning the security situation.
  QUESTION: Do you want to say a word in defense of democracy?
  MR. BOUCHER: Defense of democracy. We have looked at the leadership in Haiti as being a legitimate, elected leadership, we recognize the results of the last election, and obviously we stand with people who are elected against those who would seek to overthrow them by force.
  QUESTION: Richard, just maybe 10 days ago, the Foreign Minister and the Finance Minister of Haiti were here and they were told in no uncertain terms that unless they got their act together that the US would continue to oppose multilateral assistance and basically all non-humanitarian assistance to them.
  That, I assume, is still the position. But now what you’re saying and what you just said to George, are you saying that you want the Haitian Government, as it stands now, to go after these people?
  MR. BOUCHER: We have had a lot of concerns about the election process in Haiti, particularly with regard to the Assembly elections, the legislative elections. We have looked to the Government of Haiti to carry out a series of steps to improve democracy. I don’t have any update on that. But, indeed, we have been quite critical of some aspects of the Government of Haiti’s performance.
  On the other hand, there is a considerable difference between that and allowing the overthrow of the results of a legitimate election by armed force. So I don’t think there is any contradiction in that today.

  So, according to Boucher, the US views the Aristide government as legitimately elected, yet no official aid will be forthcoming until Haiti improves its democracy.
  END UPDATE
  

  ---

  FOCAL – the Canadian Foundation for the Americas

  FOCAL provides an excellent overview of the issues in its paper Haiti After the 2000 Elections: Searching for Solutions to a Political Crisis (PDF). This June 2001 document briefly summarizes the election discrepancies, presents an overview of national and international reaction, and notes the ‘hostile’ attitudes of the US Congress and the current administration towards Haiti.

  The report also notes that the III Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, by adopting a stringent “democracy clause” that “reinforces the importance of democratic norms within the hemisphere,” put additional pressures on the Haitian government to reconcile with the opposition. It seems that the hemispheric community is putting a stake in the ground that democracy by legitimate means will be the rule in the western hemisphere. Haiti stands to be shut out from further hemispheric summits if it cannot restore legitimacy to its government. The international community stands firm in its demand that Haiti’s political situation improve before more aid money is granted. The intractability of both factions in Haiti in their dispute over the May 2000 elections, though, makes such improvement unlikely.

  The report stresses that reforms to the CEP, Haiti’s independent election council, will be a key part of any solutions.

  Something New I Learned from this Source: The opposition party in Haiti refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Aristide government and formed a parallel government with its own president.

  ]]> http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-i/feed/ 0 http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-ii/ http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-ii/#comments Tue, 03 Feb 2004 07:23:43 +0000 stumax http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/?p=37 Source: Haiti Election page of the International Coalition of Independent Observers

  This thorough, detailed report is an excellent source of information about the 2000 elections. One caveat: The website states that “The ICIO observed the local and legislative elections in Haiti on May 21, 2000 as the only group of observers completely independent from government structures.” Though independent, ICIO’s point of view should be considered while reading this, as the lead member of the coalition appears to be Haiti Reborn, a group whose stated mission is to “advocate for a more just US foreign policy” in Haiti. Still, the report is written by authors who are not affiliated with a particular government, and so it should be read in hopes of balancing other government-based reports. To my eyes, the report is extensively researched and quite willing to show all perspectives, warts and all.

  The ICIO report contains a thorough analysis of the 2000 election, its methods and processes, including:

  • The registration process and its flaws
  • The role of International Agencies
  • Reasons for the election postponements
  • US pressure tactics to set the date of the elections
  • The actual elections and irregularities noted
  • National and International political fallout

    Voter registration was apparently a major issue in Haiti’s 2000 Elections. The Bureaus of Inscription (BI) were allotted only a month in which to register an estimated 4.2 million voters. In addition to the enormous time pressure, the BI were given photographic equipment that was difficult to operate, and there were claims that not enough registration materials had been distributed. Training, pay, and selection of BI staff were also serious issues, as were corruption and the lack of computerized Central Data Processing.

    The ICIO report while unflinchingly recognizing the serious weaknesses in the democratic process, also points out the hopeful and positive sides of the 2000 elections.

    When the elections were held on the 21st of May (in most of the country), the ICIO report states that the elections “were declared by all international and national observers to be legitimate and acceptably free and fair.” The report also states that “minor irregularities were noted…,” most of which seem to be logistical. A section of personal reflections on the elections that day describes Haitians patiently and determinedly participating in an outdoors voting bureau.

    The day after the election, opposition groups began to question the results. The OAS published a letter in the Haitian press criticizing the CEP (the provisional electoral council, responsible for certifying election results). The CEP asserted that the results were valid, but then two members affiliated with the opposition party resigned. The head of the CEP fled the country. Nonetheless, President Preval published the results and scheduled runoff elections for July 7th.

    The ICIO report agrees that the OAS criticisms of the election results were valid. “According to Article 64 of the electoral law, to be elected as a senator in the first round of elections requires an absolute majority of votes. In the counting done by the CEP in May 2000, only the top four candidates in each contest were counted, and based on these numbers the CEP determined whether or not a candidate for senate had received an absolute majority.” Nevertheless, the CEP believed it had used proper methodology under the circumstances and stood by the results, issuing a Statement of Clarification to that effect on June 30, 2000.

    The US took a hard-line stance, claiming that the CEP was not a credible body, that the run-off elections in July were highly disputed, and that given the persistent disagreement between the opposition coalition and Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party, the US would withhold further official aid and assistance.

    The OAS orchestrated several meetings between Fanmi Lavalas and the Convergence Democratique, as the opposition coalition had come to be known. There was actually some agreement between the two parties and a willingness to negotiate, but ultimately talks broke down. (See links to the original OAS reports in Part IV.)

    The ICIO report offers this asessment of “The Larger Picture” of democratic progress in Haiti from James Deroser, a deputy from Cap-Haitian:

    ”’To understand what is going on now you have to know history,’ explained Deroser. In his opinion, the entire history of Haitian politics is clan politics. The situation has always been one where 80% of the land and production are in the hands of a tiny minority, and the entire society sits on a base of exploitation. ‘Those with privilege,’ Deroser says, ‘have never looked well upon the popular movement for democracy.’

    “This impression is similar to the opinions articulated in areas of Haiti beyond the capital. ‘The opposition has no popular base, but they do have support from the United States,’ Deroser explained. This opinion says that the richest members of Haitian society have ties to Republicans in the United States. In terms of the rest of the Haitian population, over 80% are illiterate, but it is important to note that they are not stupid. ‘They understand what is happening,’ Deroser said, ‘and Jean-Bertrand Aristide is their leader. If elections were held tomorrow the population would vote for one party, Fanmi Lavalas.’”

    Though by this time the international community had removed its observers and refused to offer further financial or technical assistance, the CEP went ahead with presidential and partial senatorial elections in November.

    To continue reading part II, click the link…
    
    The ICIO was on hand with 26 volunteers to observe the November 26th elections, along with four observers from Caricom and 6,000 from the national peasant group KOZEPEP. The rest of the international community stayed at home. ICIO reported voter turnout from various sources at about 60%, with a few minor irregularities and two major irregularities in the voting places they were able to observe. The CEP certified the elections three days later, declaring Jean-Bertrand Aristide the new president.

    As the Convergence continued to dispute the elections (as they had even before they were held), the US continued to pressure Haiti for reforms. US Congressmen Gilman, Helms, and Goss issued a statement calling Haiti’s elections “a sham.” ICIO notes that no support or sources were cited in the statement.

    The conclusion section of the ICIO argues that a strong will for democracy has taken root in Haiti, and needs to be encouraged by the international community.

    Appendices to the ICIO report include a chronology of events, pre- and post-election reports, and the CEP’s statement of clarification concerning the May 21 election methodology. I encourage everyone to actually read the CEP’s statement, as at the very least it demonstrates some considered thought went into the certification of the election results. When people claim the elections of May 21, 2000 were “flawed,” this is what they’re arguing against.

    Finally, for a further perspective on the American mindset, read the last appendix, the statement released by US Congressmen Gilman, Helms, and Goss.

    Source: Embassy of Haiti – The Electoral Process

    A statement dated February 17, 2003 notes:

    The only institutional flaw identified by the Organization of American States (OAS) in Haiti�s May 21, 2000 legislative elections was the interpretation of the electoral law adopted by the electoral council to calculate the percentage of votes obtained by 8 senatorial candidates.�Nowhere in its electoral report does the OAS suggest that the entire election involving 29,500 candidates vying for close to 7,500 seats be redone, or that there was widespread fraud or misconduct that would call the election into question.�Indeed, the elections were heralded as a �great success for the Haitian population.��One observer, U.S. Congressman William Delahunt said, �the strengths so far have been the lack of violence, the huge level of participation, [estimated at 60%], and the relaxed atmosphere.��The claim today that the May 2000 elections were �flawed� or involved �fraud� obscures the small number of contested elections and the methodological issue at controversy.�To the great detriment of the Haitian people, the �crisis� that has developed between the May 21 elections and now has been allowed to spiral beyond the scope of the OAS electoral report, become a platform to block the democratic will of the majority of Haitian voters and is the pretext for preventing the flow of up to $500 million in development loans and assistance to Haiti.

    The page then continues by outlining the steps Aristide has taken to resolve the controversy, including securing the resignations of the senators whose elections were disputed and naming a new electoral council.

    ]]> http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-ii/feed/ 0 http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-iii/ http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-iii/#comments Tue, 03 Feb 2004 07:18:05 +0000 stumax http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/?p=36 Source: United Nations

    The UN maintained a mission in Haiti, UNIMH from September 1993 to June 1996, in part to set the stage for a fair election.

    In 1990, 1994, and 2000, the UN provided technical assistance to Haiti during their elections. This support included working with Haiti’s police, strengthening the justice system, and promoting human rights.

    On 17 July 2000, the Secretary-General issued a report entitled The situation of human rights and democracy in Haiti (PDF), from the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti. The report contains the following statements:

    • ”...the electoral process…unfolded in a climate of violence, intimidation and unpredictability…”
    • In delaying the elections, “there were charges that President Rene Pr�val, who had refused to issue a decree confirming a previous date on the grounds that he had not been consulted, was procrastinating.”
    • “On 8 April 2000, the headquarters of the opposition Espace de Concertation was torched by persons alleged to be Fanmi Lavalas supporters, who also stoned a radio station often critical of the Government.” [my emphasis]
    • One of 70 acts of violence between February and May took place when Jean Dominique, “a leading radio journalist whose reporting and commentary were exceptionally bold and hard-hitting, was shot dead. His murder was seen as a warning to all Haitian journalists, including those identified with the opposition, several of whom were the targets of specific threats or assaults during this period.”
    • CEP�s deteriorating relationship with the United States-funded IFES culminated with the expulsion of the local IFES director on 8 May 2000. The loss of IFES assistance was particularly apparent in the inadequate training of poll workers.

      [Note that the ICIO report explains that Micheline Begin, head of the Haiti program for IFES, had already left the country when she “was declared persona non grata by the Government after allegedly reporting to her colleagues in Washington that President Pr�val was unduly influenced by supporters of FL. ‘We can�t tolerate this sort of declaration from a foreigner,’ Prime Minister Alexis said, and called Begin�s remarks ‘an insult.’ Begin was replaced by Denise Duphenais, who acted as interim chief through the elections. According to Duphenais, IFES� relationship at an operational level with the CEP had become problematic. Starting May 6, the entire process began moving forward more smoothly. Duphenais believes this was due to increased political will to see the elections take place.” -sm]

    • The elections on May 21 “went unexpectedly well.”
    • The opposition parties immediately asserted that “fraud had been massive and systematic but produced little concrete evidence.”
    • Initial evaluations by the OAS Electoral Observation Mission concluded that there had been no systematic fraud, though there were “many minor irregularities and a few serious ones, including instances in which armed gunmen stole ballots, but those irregularities were isolated and did not affect the overall credibility of the elections.” These conclusions were confirmed by an organization of Haitian electoral observers.

      Paragraph 14 notes the heart of the dispute:

      “14. On close examination, it was discovered that the CEP Senate results had not been calculated according to the electoral law. All 17 of the Senate contests held on 21 May 2000 were won in the first round (16 of them by Fanmi Lavalas and one by an independent). If properly calculated, however, a run-off would have been required for eight of those seats, for which no candidate obtained an absolute majority of all votes cast, as required by the electoral law. In the view of EOM [the OAS Electoral Observation Mission], the credibility of the entire electoral process would be jeopardized if that ‘serious error’ were not corrected. CEP and Government officials argued, without substantiation, that the same (wrong) method of calculation had been used in previous elections. Haitian officials strongly rejected suggestions that the results be recalculated, justifying the decision in part because it obviated the need for costly run-offs. Fanmi Lavalas called on its supporters to defend its election victory, resulting in two days of aggressive demonstrations by several hundred protesters outside embassies and offices of the international community in Port-au-Prince.”

      To continue reading Part III, click the link…
      
      The report then goes on to describe the Fanmi Lavalas supporters’ protests in the streets of Port-au-Prince. The CEP (the provisional electoral council charged with certifying the elections) then broke down, with two members resigning and the CEP president fleeing the country in fear of his safety, claiming he had been under pressure “from the Government in particular, to confirm the provisional Senate results and thereby disregard the electoral law.”

      Then, in paragraph 16:

      “16. After a weekend free of disturbances, Fanmi Lavalas supporters repeated their protest on 19 June 2000, this time paralysing the entire metropolitan area and provincial highways with barricades of felled trees, rocks and flaming tires. Police rarely intervened. At the end of the day, the six remaining CEP members issued final results for the Senate elections, using the same disputed system of calculation and confirming the first round victories of the 16 Fanmi Lavalas candidates and one independent. According to CEP�s final results for the first round of the Chamber of Deputies elections, in which the percentages appeared to have been calculated correctly, Fanmi Lavalas won about a third of the seats outright and was front-runner in run-offs for most of the other seats. Fanmi Lavalas won most municipal councils overwhelmingly; they were elected by simple plurality. Final results were released before CEP issued its findings on many of the challenges filed.”

      This, then, becomes the fulcrum point on which international policy will pivot. The CEP certifies the election results, but the international community disputes the methodology. Haiti continues with a second round of elections, but now the UN and the OAS are not involved as observers, meaning these and the subsequent presidential elections have no legitimacy in the eyes of the world.

      In November, the UN publishes another report, a/55/618 (PDF), one that contains some astute observations about the effects of the worsening crisis and the international response. The report mentions that the opposition had called for the annulment of the May 21 elections, stating that they were too flawed to be credible. Other civil society organizations, it noted, did not call for annulment, only that “the authorities address the serious electoral irregularities in order to avoid exacerbating the political crisis and jeopardizing much-needed international assistance.”

      Paragraph 7 of this report states:

      “7. After the mission led by OAS Secretary-General C�sar Gaviria in mid-August and several visits by envoys of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the United States of America had failed to stop the seating of the new Parliament on 28 August, Haiti�s main bilateral donors announced the end of ‘business as usual’. They would not finance the November elections or any electoral observer missions, they would not recognize the new Parliament, and they would henceforth provide little or no assistance to the Government of Haiti, channelling it all through nongovernmental organizations. The United States Administration also stated that it would consider opposing Haitian loan requests from international financial institutions. All this was to stay in effect until an independent and credible CEP was established; there was some accommodation on the 21 May elections, especially the contested Senate seats; and a dialogue was started with the opposition on ways to strengthen Haitian democracy. Meanwhile, the European Union, which had already suspended some projects in July, took steps to invoke a provision of the Lom� Convention which could lead to the suspension of its assistance.”

      Though it sent an expert to consider offering further assistance prior the the November elections, the UN left the country in mid-October. This may have been partly due to the fatal shooting of a MICAH (UN Support Mission) staff member on August 7th and an attempted carjacking of another UN vehicle in September.

      Paragraph 12 details the ever-worsening national turmoil:

      “12. The deepening political crisis and the continued suspension of much financial assistance by international financial institutions precipitated a fall in the Haitian gourde, from 18 to the United States dollar in May to around 25 at present. This has provoked a surge in the price of basic commodities in a country in which the majority lives in great poverty. An additional spur to inflation came from a 44 per cent hike in the price of fuel, which the Government was obliged to introduce on 2 September because of the increase in world oil prices. This has already prompted a one-day general strike backed by the opposition and a three-day closure of petrol stations, and is expected to lead to further protests. The constraints on Government spending � exacerbated by the need to finance the November elections from its own resources � have given rise to unrest in the public sector. In the meantime, the expectations of the so-called popular organizations that they would be rewarded with jobs for supporting Fanmi Lavalas (by means of the violent street demonstrations held during the electoral period) have emerged as an additional source of pressure on the Government and Fanmi Lavalas. ”

      In its conclusion, the report lays the blame directly on the Haitian authorities for the country’s crisis, acknowledging that their actions are preventing the country’s access to international financial assistance which might ease Haiti’s economic woes.

      On July 18th, the European Union issues this letter (PDF) to the UN in support of its actions in Haiti. The EU’s letter provides for the suspension of EU aid to Haiti.

      ]]> http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-iii/feed/ 0 http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-iv/ http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-iv/#comments Tue, 03 Feb 2004 07:07:31 +0000 stumax http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/?p=35 Source: The Organization of American States

      The OAS appears to have been the organization most involved in the Haitian Electoral process and took the most active role in resolving the disputes subsequent to the May 21 election.

      One note about the OAS website: forget trying to find information by using their search function. In order to finally find relevant documents through the OAS, I ended up using Google to search within the site, thus: haiti election site:www.oas.org 2000

      On April 3, 2000, the OAS EOM (Electoral Observation Mission) issues this press release condemning the assassination of Jean Dominque, an outspoken Haitian radio journalist. The EOM calls the murder, “perpetrated during the electoral campaign, a strike against freedom of the press in Haiti, as well as against democracy.”

      On May 24, 2000, three days after the election, the EOM issues this press release noting that the election process had proceed smoothly overall. The EOM details several irregularities, but reassures that the isolated nature of the incidents would affect only a tiny percentage of the overall vote. The Press Release concludes by saluting “the Haitian people for their determination to go to the polls and elect representatives.”

      A July 13, 2000 press release reported that the OAS had suspended its mission on July 7, 2000, “two days before the second round of elections, citing serious irregularities in the calculation of senatorial results.” Orlando Marville, Chief of the EOM, “expressed the Mission�s concern about a number of serious irregularities which, in the case of legislative elections in particular, compromised the credibility of those elections. Marville cited the calculation of the percentages of votes obtained by the senatorial candidates as the most grave irregularity which occurred during the electoral process, since it violated both Haiti’s Constitution and electoral law and resulted in 10 senatorial races being erroneously decided in the first round.”

      On the same day, Ambassador Marville issued his Chief of Mission Report to the OAS Permanent Council. According to the report, more than 29,000 candidates ran for 7,500 elected positions throughout the country in May of that year. The CEP (Provisional Electoral Council) “also completed the identification of the 11,238 Bureaux de Vote and recruited poll workers to manage the BVs on Election Day.”

      The EOM’s report, after acknowledging difficulties, has glowing words for the eventual election:

      “Election Day was postponed on at least three separate occasions and these delays had a deleterious effect on the electoral process.� Political parties husbanded their resources anticipating another delay and the electoral campaign never began in earnest.� Despite the delays and its effects, however, the CEP eventually accomplished the major tasks necessary to successfully conduct the May 21 elections. The day was a great success for the Haitian population, which turned out in large and orderly numbers to choose both their local and national governments, and to the Haitian National Police, whose capacity had beeen questioned by the political parties, by the Government and by the Press, but who had been able to keep order quietly and effectively.

      “Election Day proceedings on May 21 represented the high point of the electoral process.� An estimated 60 percent of registered voters went to the polls.� Very few incidents of violence were reported.� The Haitian National Police responded efficiently and professionally to situations that could have deteriorated into violence.� Party poll watchers and national observers were present at almost every polling station observed by the OAS and performed their jobs for the most part in an objective manner.� While voters had to wait in long lines, especially at the beginning of the day, they were eventually able to cast their ballots free of pressure and intimidation.� Most voters were able to find their polling with relative ease.”

      However, the EOM lists several incidents of violence and chaos “in some localities.” Several opposition candidates were arrested, though the report makes no mention of the charges.

      The EOM’s election audit identifies “at least several senators and perhaps as many as three deputies who should have participated in a second round election, but were declared winners in the first round. Moreover, the Mission has identified candidates for the Chamber of Deputies who had been excluded from a second round election.” The report specifically cites one case in which the CEP seems to have favored the putative second-place candidate.

      The report then sums up the credibility of the elections thusly:

      “With respect to the municipal and local elections, the Mission’s overall conclusion is that a series of irregularities appear to have affected an unspecified number of local elections in the country.� However, since one political party won most of the elections by a substantial margin, it is probably unlikely that the majority of the final outcomes in local elections have been affected.

      “In the case of legislative elections, the Mission considers that a number of irregularities did compromise the credibility of these elections, particularly with respect to the senatorial race. As noted in this report, the posting of results at the communal and departmental levels was sporadic and lacked transparency.� OAS observers who were able to obtain results on these levels noted discrepancies affecting the results in both the senate and the chamber of deputies.� Challenges presented by the political parties were not treated in a systematic, professional or transparent manner.”

      However, the calculation of percentages of votes becomes the major sticking point for the EOM. “The Constitution and the electoral law of Haiti clearly stipulate that a senatorial candidate must receive an absolute majority of the valid votes cast. If not, the candidate must participate in a second round election.”

      [Meaning, if there are 5 candidates for a seat and 100 votes are cast, a winning candidate must garner at least 51 votes. If no candidate wins 51 votes, there must by law be a run off. The CEP’s method, though, limited the number of candidates, say to 3 in our example, by kicking out the bottom few vote-getters, then calculated the percentages of the votes the remaining candidates received. Here’s what happens: Method 1 is the constitutional method. Method 2 is the CEP’s ad hoc method. Remember that 100 total votes were cast in our example.

      candidate	votes	method 1 %	method 2
      1	30	30	60%
      2	20	20%	40%
      3	10	10%	20%
      4	6	6%	—
      5	4	4%	—

      Using Method 1, candidates enter a runoff. Using Method 2, candidate 1 is the outright winner. -sm]

      The CEP refused to change its methodology and the OAS Mission suspended further observation activity on July 7th.

      To continue reading Part IV, click the link:
      
      The Second Report on the Mission of the Organization of American States to Haiti was issued on October 27, 2000. OAS Assistant Secretary General Einaudi brought together Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party with members of the opposition, or Convergence D�mocratique, in an attempt at reconcilliation. The meeting was described as constructive and disciplined.

      Einaudi presented a paper of seven talking points for the two parties to respond to and found some agreement and some disagreement. The parties agreed on the importance of security, on the need to appoint a new Electoral Council with broad political representation, and on measures the paper suggested for strengthening democracy, including “freedom of information and the press and the rights of and security of political parties and civil society.”

      The parties disagreed, though, on issues having to do with the May 21 elections, with the Fanmi Lavalas wanting to stay on target to swear a president into office by February 7, 2001 and the Convergence demanding annulment of the elections of May 21.

      Ultimately, no further progress was made at the talks and the presidential elections were held on November 26, 2000.

      The Third Report of the Mission of the Organization of American States to Haiti was issued on February 28, 2001. The report’s author seemed satisfied with the results of the November 26th election, though still strongly condemning Haiti’s failure to resolve the disputed May elections.

      The one significant development noted here is Aristide’s action in asking the five contested senators of the Lavalas party and one independent to step down. Also, the entire membership of the CEP resigned, though they were replaced by Aristide unilaterally, without consulting the opposition.

      The Fourth Report of the Mission of the Organization of American States to Haiti, if it exists, does not seem to appear on the OAS website.

      The Fifth Report of the Mission of the Organization of American States to Haiti is dated January 8th, 2002. A mixture of progress and entrenchment has been made in the intervening year since the Third Report. Lavalas are determined to stand by the results of the 2000 elections even as the opposition and OAS continue to push for a new round. Lavalas seem open to new elections in theory, but they won’t accept any conditions that call the validity of the 2000 elections into question.

      Scattered violence and an ever-worsening economic situation make free and open debate between the two parties problematic.

      The Sixth Report of the Mission of the Organization of American States to Haiti was issued on August 28, 2002. The report is a one-page summary followed by three drafts of an accord marked to show the differences between where Lavalas and Convergence agree and where they disagree.

      On December 17th, 2001, an armed attack was carried out on the National Palace in Port-au-Prince and on the headquarters and private residences of the opposition. The OAS launched an independent inquiry into the events of that and subsequent days, the report of which is filed here. While not going as far as to say that the Aristide government planned and executed the attack, the report does find serious faults with the government’s ability to maintain the Rule of Law. The report seems to support claims that pro-government thugs (known as chimeres) intimidate anyone who isn’t pro-Lavalas.

      On September 14, 2003, the OAS issues Resolution 822 – Support for Strenthening Democracy in Haiti. The resolution outlines once more the steps Haiti must take to establish a legitimate democratic government.

      ]]> http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-iv/feed/ 0 http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-v/ http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/archives/elections-in-haiti-in-2000-part-v/#comments Tue, 03 Feb 2004 07:04:06 +0000 stumax http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/?p=34 Perspectives

      It’s time for me to get back to the main purpose of my research – the story of Toussaint Louverture. The study of the 2000 elections, though, has left me with some questions that I would follow up on if I had time. Perhaps I’ll get back to these at some point, or perhaps someone with some insight will care to comment on these entries.

      1. In UN pub a/55/154, the report of the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti, the claim is made that an unexpectedly high number of citizens seeking voter cards led to the delayed election. The report intimates in paragraph 3 that President Pr�val was “procrastinating.” Who made these charges?
      2. In paragraph 4 of the same report, the Secretary-General urges Pr�val that “the prompt holding of free, transparent and credible elections was an essential step” in creating the proper conditions for democracy. Why were they pushing so hard if the country wasn’t logistically ready to hold elections? Why did the Secretary-General not encourage Pr�val to take his time to get the elections done well and credibly?
      3. The UN report is, in fact, full of unsupported allegations and half-truths. For example, the report mentions the expulsion of the IFES director, but doesn’t mention that she had already left the country and had been replaced by an interim director. (see the ICIO report) Still, it blames the loss of the director for “inadequate training of poll workers.” Is the ICIO report wrong, or is the UN report wrong (or intentionally misleading)?
      4. Why would three US congressmen issue a statement calling the elections a sham? Their language seems inflammatory and irresponsible, almost bizarrely so. Who were they trying to influence?
      1. The OAS report which calls the senatorial and deputy seats into question does not charge fraud, only that those candidates should have been involved in a second round election. Does this really seem like enough of a reason to question the Aristide government’s legitimacy and to deny vital aid money to the Haitian government? In other words, while some election irregularities were serious, doesn’t it seem like the will of the people was, in the main, implemented in the 2000 elections?

         By the way, this research was conducted entirely online, which means that it is limited to information that is available on various websites. I also checked CARICOM, IFES, and NDI, but found no documents which significantly added to my understanding.

         My personal perspective:

         The situation in Haiti is volatile. Each side fights hard for an edge. Given this backdrop, it seems unreasonable to expect a democratic process to spring forth fully formed from the brow of Saturn, as it were. We may have to content ourselves with small steps. Democracy in Haiti needs its small wins – like peaceful polling – rewarded by increased international support, while at the same time receiving strong encouragement and incentives to fix the remaining problems. But we have to help them fix those problems. We cannot just abandon the country in disgust and expect anything to get better. We then allow the opposition justification for their belligerence and give the ruling party little choice but to respond in kind.

         International policy towards Haiti seems like that of a doctor who says to a patient, �I have this medicine that will heal you, but I won�t give it to you until you’re healthy.�

         One thing does seem clear to me: The Haitian people did their honest best under extraordinarily difficult conditions to participate in the democratic process. How many Americans would walk three hours just to register to vote? How many of us would stand outside in the hot sun to cast our choice for president? I don’t even go to the polls any more; I vote by mail! I take for granted that kind of access and faith in the American democratic system, a system that has been developed and refined continually over more than 200 years and which has had its share of problems. Given that, what we ask of Haiti seems unfair and counterproductive to the goal of Haitian democracy.

         Various quotes collected along the way:

         In a statement before the U.S. House of Representatives, John Conyers stated: “We are holding Haiti to a higher standard than we are holding other nations including ourselves� Haiti�s elections were relatively free of violence and we witnessed a firm commitment from Haitian citizens to have democratic elections. We observed great levels of voter participation and an overwhelming sense of civic pride, and concerted efforts toward the conduct of credible elections� Why are we so quick to condemn a country that has so little but is so important to our country� Haiti is a fragile new democracy. This is only its third election since it rid itself of over fifty years of dictatorship rule. If only we could have been so perfect so early in our development as a full functioning democracy.” From: Haiti Elections

         Visiting Haiti during the June 1995 election, Dr. (Robert) Pastor found it flawed by technical and administrative problems, and its results were widely disputed. However, he said, “Compared to 200 years of dictatorship and repression, the election was a step out of the past. Whether it will be a step forward or sideways remains to be seen.”
         From: Carter Center#

         Erin Soto and Sharon Bean at the United States Agency for International Development shared what they called a grassroots perspective on Haiti�s democratic process. It was their observation that in Haiti, political will is everything, and it was this that allowed the CEP to pull off the elections on November 26.
         From: Haiti Elections

         There continues to be enormous resistance to seeing the progress of the democratic process in Haiti. It appears that the greatest obstacle to the creation of this process is those who stand to lose the most with the advent of a new era of Haitian history, an era where the needs of the poor are served by the government. Those who will lose in this process are not only Haitians. In fact, our existing global order is threatened by the concept of empowering the poor in Haiti. Those who lose in a vigilant participatory democracy are those who have historically benefited from their exclusive status. As Noam Chomsky states, “If a tiny and impoverished country with minuscule resources can begin to do something for its own population, others may ask: �Why not us?� The weaker and more insignificant a country, the more limited its means and resources, the greater is the threat of a good example. The rot may spread, threatening regions of real concern to the rulers of much of the world” (N. Chomsky, The Managua Lectures, p. 39).
         From: Haiti Elections

         But, as Alvaro Arciniegas pointed out, the concept of sharing power is foreign to Haiti. There is a mentality that “If I�m not in control I disqualify everything that is beyond my control.” Parties that were unable to control the whole electoral apparatus rejected it. Arciniegas said, “The culture of democracy has not taken root; it needs to be built. People need to believe in democracy and share power.” The concept of power sharing and negotiation are essential to the participatory nature of the process.
         From: Haiti Elections

         Click the following link for a book list…
         
         h3. Books on Haiti, elections, and international policy

         NB: I haven’t actually read these books, but I looked them up as part of my research. I’m including the list since it may be useful to others. All books are available through Amazon.com.

         Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy: A Report of the Csis Americas Program (Csis Report)
         Fauriol, Georges A. (Editor)

         Sanctions In Haiti Gibbons, Elizabeth D. Synopsis Gibbons analyzes the ruinous three-year trade embargo imposed on Haiti in response to the September 1991 coup d’etat to President Aristide’s return to office in October 1994. Drawing on contemporary research of noted academics and international legal experts, Gibbons places Haiti’s experience of san About the Author ELIZABETH D. GIBBONS is Deputy Director of UNICEF’s Office of Emergency Programs. Book Description Gibbons analyzes the ruinous three-year trade embargo imposed on Haiti in response to the September 1991 coup d’etat to President Aristide’s return to office in October 1994. Drawing on contemporary research of noted academics and international legal experts, Gibbons places Haiti’s experience of sanctions in a wider context. From the Haiti case, she draws conclusions about the utility of comprehensive sanctions as instruments for the advancement of democracy and human rights and recommends measures that policymakers may find better suited to achieving these objectives. U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives Gilman, Benjamin A.� A Proslavery Foreign Policy : Haitian-American Relations during the Early Republic Matthewson, Tim Book Description While the influence of racial policy has long been a factor in American foreign policy, one particularly evident example is U.S. relations with Haiti. The troubled relationship began under George Washington, who authorized the dispatch of arms and ammunition to help the French planters of Saint Dominque, present day Haiti, suppress the black rebellion. Washington’s support for the defense of slavery in this regard, proved to be important precident in the formulation of a proslavery policy in the White House, the State Department, and the Congress. Matthewson explores this stormy legacy and discusses the tension between racial and economic imperatives that would contiue to plague relations with the island nation for decades to come.

         �
         Haiti: Foreign Policy and Government Guide (World Foreign Policy and Government Library)
         No Author

         U.S. policy toward Haiti : hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, first session, Tuesday, November 9, 1999 (SuDoc Y 4.IN 8/16:H 12/8) No Author Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean Pastor, Robert Raul Alfons�n “A magnificent contribution to understanding U.S.-Latin America relations and for offering a provocative vision of the relationship…” Abraham F. Lowenthal, Foreign Affairs “An impressive volume… a significant contribution to rethinking U.S. relations with our closest neighbors.” Book Description In this second edition of Whirlpool, Pastor provides an overview of US Latin American policy under Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, with special attention devoted to the role played by Congress. Next he looks at the recurring challenges faced by the United States – how the United States has tried but often failed to manage succession crises, stop revolutionaries, promote elections, and encourage development. Pastor offers a series of far-reaching policy recommendations for exiting the whirlpool, based on a renunciation of unilateral intervention and a forging of a freer trade area. This second edition is thoroughly updated, with detailed new considerations of the cases of Nicaragua and Mexico in particular, and of the concept of hemispheric community. �

         Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940
         Renda, Mary A.
         From Library Journal In July 1915, U.S. armed forces occupied Haiti, where they remained until 1934. Renda (history and women’s studies, Mt. Holyoke Coll.) explores the intellectual underpinnings of the U.S. military and political actions and how the occupation affected American intellectuals and artists. Supporting the economic and military reasons for the occupation was a sense of paternalism and racism. Haitians were seen as a backward, inferior people needing the white man’s benevolent protection. This protection turned at times to violence, as U.S. marines suppressed Haitian uprisings during the occupation. In turn, the exotic nature of Haiti as a whole, and the lure of its voodoo tradition in particular, shaped individual Marines along with black and white American thinkers, writers, and artists: Orson Welles, Eugene O’Neill, James Weldon, Langston Hughes, and Zora Neale Hurston produced wonderful works of art inspired by Haiti. Renda uses a wide collection of materials from diaries, memoirs, letters, books, plays, and the arts to produce an excellent cultural study of the development of American imperialism. Recommended for all libraries. Stephen L. Hupp, West Virginia Univ., Parkersburg Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc. LIBRARY JOURNAL “Renda uses a wide collection of materials…to produce an excellent cultural study of the development of American imperialism. Recommended for all libraries.” Book Description The U.S. invasion of Haiti in July 1915 marked the start of a military occupation that lasted for nineteen years—and fed an American fascination with Haiti that flourished even longer. Exploring the cultural dimensions of U.S. contact with Haiti during the occupation and its aftermath, Mary Renda shows that what Americans thought and wrote about Haiti during those years contributed in crucial and unexpected ways to an emerging culture of U.S. imperialism. At the heart of this emerging culture, Renda argues, was American paternalism, which saw Haitians as wards of the United States. She explores the ways in which diverse Americans—including activists, intellectuals, artists, missionaries, marines, and politicians—responded to paternalist constructs, shaping new versions of American culture along the way. Her analysis draws on a rich record of U.S. discourses on Haiti, including the writings of policymakers; the diaries, letters, songs, and memoirs of marines stationed in Haiti; and literary works by such writers as Eugene O’Neill, James Weldon Johnson, Langston Hughes, and Zora Neale Hurston. Pathbreaking and provocative, Taking Haiti illuminates the complex interplay between culture and acts of violence in the making of the American empire.

         �
         Haiti’s Turmoil: Politics and Policy Under Aristide and Clinton (WPF Report #32)
         Rotberg, Robert I.
         About the Author Robert I. Rotberg is President, World Peace Foundation, and Director, WPF Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He was Professor of Political Science and History, MIT; Academic Vice President, Tufts University; and President, Lafayette College. He was a Presidential appointee to the Council of the National Endowment for the Humanities and is a Trustee of Oberlin College. He is the author and editor of numerous books and articles on U.S. foreign policy, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. Book Description When President Clinton’s forcefully-backed initiative restored democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in 1994, Haiti seemed poised to prosper politically and economically. The poorest part of the Americas had promises of abundant international funding, plus UN, OAS, and U.S. assurances of medium-term capacity building efforts. Everyone except the departing military junta wanted Aristide and Haiti to succeed. Sadly, success has proved elusive. That Haiti still suffers from its rulers and ruling classes, and that President Aristide’s leadership has failed to unite Haitians or to evoke continuing support from the international community, greatly concerns policy makers and everyone who wishes better for the Haitian people. This report is a commentary on Haiti’s recent vicissitudes and on the policy choices that were made before and during the Clinton and Aristide presidencies. Haiti deserves more effective leaders and more successful policies.

         �
         The Rainy Season: Haiti Since Duvalier
         Wilentz, Amy
         From Publishers Weekly In 1986, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, Haiti’s “president-for-life,” was forced to flee his country. A military junta had seized power, and the widespread feeling of unrest that had been brewing for years among the Haitian peasantry and the urban poor came to a boil, resulting in chaos: mass strikes, riots and other forms of violence. Wilentz’s first book carefully, sensitively narrates these events in the first person, providing historical background when necessary, and telling the stories of Haitians from all walks of life, from the infamous “Tontons Macoute”—a ruthless government-sponsored vigilante group—to voodoo priests (who speak at length of their magic), and including government officials, missionaries, intellectuals, workers and the unemployed. The former Time reporter’s numerous visits to the island between 1986 and 1988 enrich her account with details of daily life, both in the dilapidated alleys and slums of Port-au-Prince and in remote villages tucked away in lush tropical mountains. Her vivid record of an important piece of contemporary world history captures the sad political and quotidian existence of an impoverished albeit physically beautiful country. Copyright 1989 Reed Business Information, Inc.—This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title. From Library Journal This welcome interpretation of Haiti provides many insights into a country that few North Americans understand. Wilentz, a journalist, captures the complex cultural ambience and mystery of domestic politics with a penetrating eye and powerful description. Covering the years 1986-89, Wilentz analyzes political developments, centering her interpretations on the activities of a radical priest, interspersed with individual Haitian portraits and personal incidents. The flavor of Haiti is superbly… read more—This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

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